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By Stewart C. Myers
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Determining the value of streams of returns yielded by financial
assets is a task common to many sorts of economic analysis. The litera-
ture on this subject is extensive at all levels of abstraction. Most
of this work, however, has not come to grips with one pervasive con-
sideration—that is, uncertainty.
This paper presents a model of security valuation in which un-
certainty takes the central role. The model is based on the require-
ments for security market equilibrium in a "time-state-preference"
framework, in which uncertainty is described by a set of event-sequences,
or states of nature. The framework used here is a generalized version
of that used in articles by Arrow., Debreu and Hirshleifer, as well as
3in several more recent studies.
The valuation formulas presented here are, of course, imperfect.
They cannot be represented as handy empirical tools. On the theoretical
front, moreover, new results and new problems seem always to arrive hand
in hand. Although the problems are duly noted, the time-state-preference
model will be defended as a plausible approximation and a useful analytical
tool.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, existing valuation
models are briefly reviewed. The basic time-state-preference model is

derived and discussed in Section III,. This requires careful statement
of the assumed market characteristics and the constraints on investors'
strategies: although the general characteristics of the formulas ob-
tained are intuitively appealing, their precise form is sensitive to the
range of trading opportunities open to investors „ The effects of con-
straints on these opportunities are considered. In Section IV, the special
case discussed by Arrow, Debreu and Hirshleifer^ is related to the more
general framework presented here. Some general implications of the model
are considered in Section V.
Finally, we consider the possible effects of what I call "the inter-
dependence of investors' strategies," which arises whenever the value of
a security to an investor depends on other investors' beliefs and mar-
ket strategies. This interdependence leads to price uncertainty, which
is difficult to incorporate in the traditional, static models of equili-
brium. Thus, it is difficult to evaluate its systematic effect, if any,
on the structure of security prices. It is possible, however, to make
qualitative comments on the nature of the problem and its possible effects.
The main contributions of this paper, as I see them, are as follows:
1. The paper is a general investigation of how markets for risky
assets work. It is more exploratory than definitive, which
should not be surprising: work on this topic has a relatively
short history, and has concentrated mostly on conceptual issues.
However, this paper is one of the first detailed investigations
of a particular market under relatively plausible conditions.
2. It is widely agreed that the time-state-preference framework
developed by Arrow, Debreu and Hirshleifer is an important

addition to the economist's theoretical tool-kit. This
paper shows that the framework is amenable to considerable
generalization and adaptation to particular market conditions,
3. The model presented below was originally developed as a con-
tribution to the theory of corporate financial management.
Although details are not included here, it has proved useful
in this context. Thus it should be worthwhile to set out
the logic of the model in detail as a basis for further
work,
II. OTHER APPROACHES
Normally, the present value of a security is defined as;
oo
p
^(i^
where R(t) represents the expected return at period t, and r is a "re-
quired rate of return," assumed to include a risk premium to compensate
the investor for bearing the uncertainty inherent in the stream of returns.
For stocks, this usually is taken to mean that price equals the discounted
value of future dividends.
This approach is undoubtedly useful. The trouble is that writers
who use it normally offer only the most casual explanations of what deter-
mines whether r is small or large. It does not help to say that "k is a
positive function of the riskiness of the stream of expected returns" unless
Q
"riskiness" can be defined--and this is not exactly simple.
Another variant of discounted present value uses certainty equivalents

of expected returns. Here,
oD
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with i defined as the riskless rate of interest, and the terms o(.(t)R(t)
as certainty equivalents of the expected returns R(t)„ The coefficients
cK(t) are chosen so that the investor is indifferent to the expected re-
turns R(t) and certain returns amounting to oC(t)R(t) for each future
period t„
9Although the use or certainty equivalents has advantages, Eq. (2)
is not of much help unless the determinants of the coefficients [oC(l)^
. .
. , oCCt), . , .] are known.
In most discussions, the formula for the present value of a stream
of returns is rigorously derived only for conditions of certainty.
Addition of the coefficients o(,(t) to the numerator
_,
or a risk premium
to the discount rate, is simply a heuristic, though plausible, adaptation
of the formula for the certainty case The model presented in the next
section puts present value under uncertainty on a more rigorous basis.
Another approach to valuation has been taken by Sharpe and Lintner,
who have used the procedures for portfolio selection originally developed
by Markowitz as a framework for formal models of capital markets under
uncertainty. Briefly, the characteristics of these models are as
follows:
1. Each investor is assumed to purchase securities on the
basis of their anticipated returns in one (presumably
short) period from t = to t = 1, and not on the basis

of anticipated returns in any subsequent periods. In
other words, the investor expects to choose a new port-
folio at t = 1 (but not before), and is indifferent to
the amount of trading which may be required to obtain
the portfolio which will be optimal for him at that time
2, The value of any feasible portfolio to an investor is
a positive function of the expected percentage return
(dividends or interest, plus or minus changes in market
value) of the portfolio, and a negative function of the
variance of this return. Other possible determinants of
the value of portfolios to investors are not considered.
3. The value of the k security depends on the expected
return of the security, the variance of this return and
the covariances of the k c h security's return with re-
turns on the other securities which may be purchased.
This sort of model is an extremely valuable tool for analyzing the
mechanisms by which investors' demands for portfolios of risky securi-
ties affect the market prices of these securities. In many instances,
however, the potential usefulness of these models is limited by the fact
that they explain prices only in terms of investors ' expectations of future
prices. From the point of view of a corporation's financial manager, for
instance, portfolio analysis models are directly useful only if investors'
present expectations of future prices can be explained; and this is just
as formidable a task as explaining present prices.
Lintner has recognized this problem, proposing that a security price
at any future time be regarded as a simple function of the mean, variance.

and covariances of subsequent returns. By an iterative argument, future
prices may be eliminated from the valuation formula. This extension
of the portfolio analysis framework is an alternative to the model de-
scribed below. In my opinion, the time-state-preference model is a more
flexible and powerful tool. However, there are surely sufficient problems
to support both approaches.
III. THE BASIC TIME-STATE-PREFERENCE MODEL
One way of describing uncertainty about conditions in a future period
is to say that one of a set of possible states of nature will occur at
that time. Definition of a set of states of nature in turn provides a
means of describing the risk characteristics of securities, since any se-
curity can be regarded as a contract to pay an amount which depends on the
state which actually occurs.
For instance, we might regard a share of stock as a contract to pay
an x dollar dividend if state 1 occurs at t = 1, a y dollar dividend if
state 2 occurs at t = 1, etc. Let the dividend paid be R(s,t) and sup-
pose 100 states of nature are being considered for t = 1. Then the set
<R(s,l)j = ]R(1,1), R(2,l),
. . ., R(100,l) J specifies the particular
bundle of contingent payments which the investor obtains for t = 1 by
purchasing one share. In this case, R(l,l) = x,R(2,l) = y, and so on.
The following model relates the present value of a security to the
present value of the contingent returns the security may pay to its owner.
This relationship will be derived from the necessary conditions of security
market equilibrium. First, however, the assumed characteristics of the
market must be carefully specified.

Assumptions
1. States of Nature ,, -- A state of nature which may occur at
time *C is defined as a particular sequence of events during the time
span from t = 1 to t = ~C „ Constructing a set of possible states is
simply a means of identifying the possible event-sequences relevant to
present decisions
„
The concept of an event-sequence is ambiguous, however, if "event"
is left undefined, since a possibility that is relevant in one context
may not be in another. The consequences of some decisions depend only
on whether a stock's price rises or falls. In other cases, the decision-
maker may consider the possible prices of a score of securities and the
possible fortunes of a family business as well.
A benchmark can be established by imagining a set of states defined
in such great detail that the knowledge of which state will occur at any
time t would allow the specification of every characteristic of the
future world from the present to time t. Let this set be S„ The sets
of states which would be considered relevant to actual decisions may be
regarded as partitions of S. Thus if an investor finds it useful to iden-
tify a state by "GM's dividend is increased at t = 1," the state refers
to that subset of S for which this "event" takes place.
In the model presented here, it is assumed that investors agree on
a particular partition, which defines a set of states j (s^t) r „ The
set is assumed to apply to the time span from t = 1 to t = T. Condi-
tions at t = are known with certainty. The set J (s,t) i is sufficiently
detailed that, if state s occurs at time t, then returns on every security
are uniquely specified for period t and all previous periods. Also^

the set of states is finite and exhaustive with respect to possible se-
quences of security returns.
Given these conditions, a security's contingent returns )R(s,t) /
are not random variables; the return R(s,t) is certain to be paid in
period t if state s occurs, However, it is important to remember that
the set ) (s,t) > does not catalogue all possible future events Even if
it could be known that a particular state (s,t) is to occur, an investor
would still face a residual uncertainty about his health, tastes, family
status, employment, etc.
2. The Economy . -- We will imagine an economy split into real
and financial sectors. For present purposes, "financial sector" and
"security markets" are synonymous.
It is clearly meaningless to speak of the equilibrium of security
markets except in relation to a particular set of conditions in the real
sector. Accordingly, the following items are taken as given:
a. The set of states j(s,t)l
.
b. Investors' assessments of the probabilities that
the various states will occur.
c. The (sequences of) security returns contingent on
each state (s, t) „
Also, it is assumed that investors have given endowments of wealth
available for allocation among securities and other uses, which will be
referred to collectively as "consumption."
3. Available Securities . -- Taking conditions in the economy's real
sector as given necessitates a restriction on the types o£ securities that

may be issued in response to security prices at t = 0. There is no need
to hold supplies of all securities constant; however, it is not consistent
with the framework used here to admit changes in the supply of securities
that are part and parcel of changes in the allocation of resources within
the real sector.
To illustrate, suppose that interest rates fall at t = 0. In response,
a firm issues bonds to finance purchases of additional plant and equipment
„
These additional real assets enable the firm to pay higher returns to its
security-holders in some or all future contingencies, so that a link is
created between current interest rates and the bundle of contingent re-
turns which the firm offers to present investors. This is unacceptable if
the analysis is to be limited to conditions for equilibrium in the finan-
cial sectors.
If, on the other hand, the firm uses the bond issue to retire a por-
tion of its outstanding common stock, conditions in the real sector may
be considered unchanged. The substitution of debt for equity in a firm's
capital structure is a financing decision, and changes in the firm's real
assets or investment strategy are not a necessary consequence.
To summarize, changes in the supply of securities, or the issue of
new types of securities, are not ruled out in what follows. It is assumed,
however, that such adjustments are not of the sort that imply changed con-
ditions in the real sector . It has already been noted that the concept
"equilibrium of security markets" is meaningful only if conditions in the
real sector are given.
4. Market Characteristics . -- Markets are assumed to be perfect.
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5. Reinvestment of Contingent Returns . -- Investment in securities
amounts to the purchase of bundles of contingent returns, which may, in
general, be either consumed or reinvested when and if they are realized.
For this model, however, we will effectively rule out reinvestment by as-
suming that investors hold their original portfolios unchanged until t = T.
(This assumption is reconsidered in Section VI below.) Accordingly, a se-
curity's return in (s,t) will be interpreted as the cash payment (i.e.,
dividend, interest or principal payment) which its owner receives in (s,t).
Capital gains or losses will not be considered, except that the price of
the security in the most distant future time period under consideration
will be treated as if it were a liquidating dividend.
For stocks, this assures that market value is determined solely by
the present value of future dividends.
6. Utility Functions . -- Investors choose portfolios which we assume
maximize the expected utility of future returns on the portfolio. In addi-
tion, the total expected utility associated with any portfolio is a linear
function of utility functions defined for each state. Specifically, if
~jf(s,t) is an investor's judgment of the probability of occurrence of con-
tingency (s,t), and U(s,t) is the utility of returns to be received in (s,t),
then the overall utility of a portfolio's contingent returns will be given
by
<L 77*(s,t) u(s,t).
8,t
The notation . denotes summation over all states in the set
s . t
j(s,t)j,
t = 1 2 T
Further, we assume that each utility function U(s,t) is defined only
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in terras of returns to be received in (s,t). That is, if an investor holds
a portfolio yielding y in (s,t), then the utility of y will be independent
of possible outcomes in other contingencies. This assumption would not
be reasonable without our proviso that contingent returns on securities
are consumed, rather than reinvested. If, say, part of the amount y
were invested in real assets, the investor's income in subsequent contin-
gencies would be increased. As a consequence, the marginal utility of in-
come in these contingencies would not be the same, in general, as if these
funds were consumed- -i.e., invested in goods of no lasting value.
Note that, in this framework, U (s,t), the marginal utility of income
in a given contingency, may be high for either or both of two reasons:
a. Assuming that the investor is risk-averse, U'(s,t)
will be relatively high to the extent that the total in-
come to be received in (s,t) is low.
b. The utility of a given amount of money income may
differ from state to state, since the utility functions
U(s,t) are not necessarily the same for each contingency.
One class of reasons why the functions U(s,t) may depend on (s,t)
is fairly obvious: differences can arise, for instance, if commodity
prices differ from state to state and over time, or if the investor's need
for income depends on, say, his age at (s,t).
Another kind of reason follows from the way we have set up the prob-
lem. The set J(s,t)> assumed for purposes of analysis is exhaustive in
the sense that it offers a complete catalogue of possible future returns
on securities
,
but it does not catalogue all future events exhaustively.
The risks inherent in these "uncatalogued" contingencies will not, in gen-
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eral, be independent of the state (s^t) being considered. An investor
will perhaps be less certain of the amount of income he will receive from
sources other than securities in wartime, but the occurrence of a war will
also effect returns on securities. We would expect the functions U(s.,t)
to reflect such interrelationships.
Formally, then, the phrase "utility of a contingent return A in (s,t)"
must be taken to mean "the expected utility to the investor of the (certain)
amount A at time t given that state s occurs." We thus consider only a
part of the investor's over-all decision problem: the possible incremental
effects on his future income of his portfolio choice at t = 0.
The Basic Model
We begin by considering N different securities which investors can
purchase at t = 0. These securities may have been issued at t = 0, or they
may be "left over" from previous periods. The word "share" will be used
to refer to one unit of investment in a given security, although these se-
curities will, of course, include bonds, money and time deposits, for
which "share" is not the appropriate word in common usage.
For the kth security, the set ) Rj
c
(s,t)> of contingent returns per
share will be written in vector form, and referred to as R^, where
Rk = [Rk(0), • • ., R (s,t), . . .]
for s = 1, 2, . . ., m(t), and for each period t = 1, 2, . . „ , T„ The
"state" s = refers to the present -- i.e., to t = -- and for each
security R^CO) = -P^ where P^ is the ex-dividend market price per share
of the k security at t = 0.
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We define a dummy security k = to be "consumption" at t = 0, with
Rq = [1, 0, . . ., 0],
That is, purchasing one share of security zero is interpreted as the con-
sumption of one dollar at t = 0, The "price" of consumption is likewise
one dollar, so Pq = 1,
Consider the portfolio selection problem of a particular investor.
Let h^ be the number of shares of the k c security which he purchases „ His
decision problem at t = is to choose [hg, h^,
„ „ „
, hN ] to maximize ex-
pected utility i, where
(3) Y = 2~* F(s,0 U(s,t) + U(0)
,
s,t
N
with U(s,t) = f(^ t^R^Cs , t>) and U(0) = f(h
Q ).
The variables 77"(s,t)
k=l
represent the investor's assessments of the probabilities that the states
(Sjt) actually will occur.
In addition, the investor is constrained in that he has only a given
amount of wealth, W, available for allocation among consumption and invest-
ment. The constraint is
N
(4) = C. hkpk " w = 0.
k=0
Since consumption and investment in securities are the only available uses
for this wealth, Eq. (4) is necessarily an equality.
If no short selling or borrowing is permitted, then h^ > f° r aL l k„
In this case, maximizing Eq„ (3) subject to the stated constraint is a
problem in non-linear programming, and the necessary conditions for the
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maximum may be inferred from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. If a maximum
exists, we know from these conditions that we can assign a positive number
/\ (0) to the constraint Eq. (4). Maximizing utility implies that
i£
- A<*># < o.
J hk J hk
for k = 0, 1, . . ., N. The left hand side of Eq„ (5) is zero if hk > 0.
Note that d ' = Pk for k > 0, and 2_§L. = 1. Substituting in Eq. (5)
6 hk 6 hk
for security k = (i.e., consumption at t = 0) ; we obtain
(6) A(0) = U'(0),
where U (0) is the marginal utility of income used for present consumption.
Using these results, we can rewrite Eq. (5) as
^l/jW - u'(0) pk £ o
or
Pk > i/u'(0)[cT/-//hk ].
Since, for k t 0, <$ f" / J\ = ^jfis^) U'(s,t) Rk (s,t), we have the funda-
mental result
Cj q(s,t;(7) Pk > , ) Rk (s,t),
s,t
where
(8) q(s,t) = ]T(s,t) ^^
Equation (7) is the basic valuation formula for the time-state-
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preference framework. In words, it tells us that when an investor maximizes
the expected utility of his portfolio, the price of each security is at
least equal to the expectation of the marginal utility associated with a
small increment in his holdings of that security, where the utility of
money in future contingencies is measured in terms of the utility of money
used for present consumption. If the investor actually holds that security
in his portfolio, then its price is exactly equal to the expectation of
the marginal utility associated with the security. The terms q(s,t) thus
indicate the present value to this investor of an incremental dollar of port-
folio return to be received at time t if state (s,t) occurs.
A necessary condition for equilibrium is that Eq. (7) holds for all
securities from the point of view of each investor. In effect Eq. (7)
establishes a lower bound on the price of each security, expressed in
terms of investors' marginal valuations of contingent returns. For if P^
were less than the right hand side of Eq. (7) from the point of view of any
investor, then that investor could increase the total expected utility of
returns to his portfolio by purchasing security k in at least marginal
amounts. Equilibrium cannot exist until all such opportunities are ex-
hausted.
Borrowing
The introduction of investors' borrowing opportunities does not change
the necessary conditions for equilibrium given by Eq. (7). Borrowing is
simply the "purchase" of a particular type of security. If the j security
is a borrowing contract open to an investor, then its contingent cash
"returns" can be written in the same format used above:
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Rj = [Rj(0),
. . ., Rj(s,t), . . .].
The vector R: is unusual only in that R^(0) > and R;(s,t) < 0,
Selling Short
Selling short can be most conveniently analyzed within the present
framework by regarding the short sale of security k as the purchase of a
dummy security k* with a vector of contingent returns R^* derived from Ru„
The vector Rj^* will be roughly a mirror image of R^. If there are no mar-
gin requirements, then R^."" = -Rj^ in which case selling security k short
is algebraically equivalent to purchasing negative amounts of security k,
20
assuming k* is held to time t = T.
It is entirely feasible to incorporate dummy securities such as k*
in the investor's portfolio problem wherever short sales make sense. The
necessary conditions for the maximum imply a result comparable to Eq„ (7)
for each dummy security—that is.
(9) Pk* > 2j q(s,t) Rk*(s,t)
s,t
This holds with an equality if hk* ;> 0.
For the case in which there are no margin requirements, comparison
of Eqs„ (7) and (9) leads to an interesting result. As we have observed,
for this case R^* = -R^ implying that Pi* = -P^ and that R^*(Sjt) =-Rj
c
(s,t)
for all (s,t). Substituting in Eq. (9),
O q(s,t;(10) Pk ^ <£j ) Rk (s,t) .
s,t
Suppose that Pj^* is greater than the right hand side of Eq„ (9).
This signals that the investor will not want to hold the dummy security k*
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in his portfolio. If this is so, however, then from Eq. (10) it follows
that P^, the cost of purchasing security k long, is less than the utility
associated with purchase of a marginal share of security k„ Thus, if the
investor's total expected utility is reduced by selling a marginal amount
of security k short, he will necessarily be better off by purchasing a
marginal amount of k long. Conversely, if the investor's total expected
utility is reduced by purchasing a marginal amount of security k, then it
will pay him to sell security k short. Therefore, each investor at equili-
brium will be willing to hold at least marginal amounts of each security
either long or short in his portfolio. Only if this condition is satisfied
will Eqs. (7) and (10) be consistent, implying
I(ii) Pk = O q(s,t) Rk (s,t) .
s,t
Note that Eq. (11) requires that all investors agree, at the margin,
on the equilibrium values of all securities, although not necessarily on
the value of any particular contingent return. Because each investor is
willing to "take a position" in each security, there can be no such thing
as a "clientele effect." That is, investors holding a particular security
will not value it more highly than other investors do.
On the other hand, Eq. (7) _is consistent with a clientele effect. Any
such effect must therefore be ascribed to restricted trading opportunities,
not to the existence of uncertainty, or to differences in investors ' ex-
pectations.
Other Constraints
The frictions and imperfections which exist in actual markets have, for
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the most part, been left out of the above analysis. However, those which
impose constraints on investors ' portfolio choices can be analyzed with
relative ease if portfolio choice is viewed as a problem of non-linear pro-
gramming.
To illustrate, consider an investor who must keep a certain portion
of his portfolio in a particular class of securities. In practice, many
institutions are so constrained.
Specifically, suppose the investor must invest at least 100b percent
of his funds in securities from the set K. Now the objective function
must be maximized subject to two constraints:
N
0i = S hkpk - w = o,
k=0
(14) 2 = C, hkPk - bW £ 0.
k£K
For securities not included in the set K, <3 0?/J nk = 0. Here the con-
straint 02 = is irrelevant, and Eq. (7) holds. For k 6 K, however, the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
(15) £f_ - ^(0!) {$1 - ^(0 2 ) Sjh £ .
6 hk £ hk S hk
Computing ^(0i) and the partial derivatives, and solving for P^, we have:
<16) ,> s 5WJ»Jt Ws ' t)r(s'l)Vs ' t) '
assuming that k is actually included in the investor's optimal portfolio.
Since /\(0 2 ) JJL 0,, Eq. (16) insures that the investor's demand for security
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k is forced higher than it would be otherwise if the constraint is binding.
It is also possible to solve Eq. (16) for ^ (0 2 ) ;
(17) ^(0 2 ) = U'(0) - (J yr(s,t) u'(s,t)[Rk ( Sj t)/Pk ] .
s,t
In words, ^(02) i- s the expected utility lost (at the margin) by investing
one dollar in a security k £ K instead of consuming the dollar,,
IV. A SPECIAL CASE
We now return to the main thread of our argument. A necessary condi-
tion for equilibrium if short sales are permitted, and if there are no
margin requirements or other imperfections, is that Eq. (11) hold for each
investor and each security. For the i investor, then,
(11) pk = ^ qi<s,t) Rk (s,t),
8,t
k = 1, 2 } , . , 3 N. In other words, if there are N securities, equilibrium
requires that N equations of this form hold for each investor. The "unknowns"
are the variables q^(s,t), since security prices and contingent returns are
taken as given by investors in a perfect market. The set /q^(s,t) > repre-
sents the present values of contingent returns to the i investor, given
by Eq. (8).
In general, there is no requirement that investors agree on the present
value of contingent returns. However, consider the special case in which
N - M, where M is the number of future states, and M of the vectors Rk are
linearly independent. Then the equations may be solved to yield a unique
Moreover, since Pk and Rkset of prices iq i (l,l) . . . q i (s,t) „ . . C
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are the same for all investors, the set must be identical for all investors
,
Given the structure of security prices at equilibrium,, we can thus infer
an entirely objective set of prices | q(s,t) J , where q(s,t) is the price
at t = of one dollar to be paid contingent on the occurrence of (s,t)„
We have, therefore:
(20) P = Zi q(s,t) Rk (s,t),
8,t
21
with q(s,t) = q i (s,t) for all i and all (s,t).
In reality, of course, the number of securities is likely to be much
less than the number o f states. Nevertheless, this simplest possible
case is important in several respects
„
1. It is customarily argued that, since investors will dis-
agree in their subjective evaluations of the size and risk
of streams of future returns, their estimates of the value
of these streams will also differ,, This may well be true in
fact, but Eq. (20) establishes that any such disagreement is
not a necessary consequence of either (a) the existence of
uncertainty or (b) differences in investors' expectations,,
In fact, Eq„ (20) implies that all investors would agree on
the value of any conceivable bundle of contingent returns,
no matter how bizzare, which could be specified in terms of the
catalogue of contingencies J(s,t) V
„
2, Equation (20) is closely related to (and in a sense depends on)
the ability of any investor to achieve any desired pattern
of contingent returns from his portfolio. To be specific, let
the vector Xp represent the desired pattern:
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(21) Xp = [Xp (l,l), . . ., Xp (s,t), . . .] = -
l RP .
^S_! Rp (s.t)
s.t
Here Rp(s,t) is the return of the portfolio in (s.t) and Rp
is the vector of these returns „ The numbers Xp(s,t) represent
the pattern of the contingent returns Rp(s,t)„ Because
1/ Zj R (s,t) adjusts for the scale of the portfolio's re-
B,t P
turns, <C.' Xp(s.t) = 1„ The pattern of returns on an indi-
s, t r
vidual security can be described similarly:
(22) Xk = [Xk (] ), . . ., Xk (s,t), . . .] = \ Rk „£" Rk (s,t)
s,t
Since, in this special case, there are M securities
with linearly independent vectors Xk , and there are no margin
requirements for short sales, the vectors span the M-dimensional
space defined by the catalogue of M states. The portfolio
vector X^ lies in this same space „ It follows that any vector
Xp can be obtained by a linear combination of the vectors Xk „
To put this another way, we have established that an in-
vestor can adjust his portfolio to change a particular contin-
gent return Rp(s,t), while leaving returns in all other con-
tingencies unchanged. In effect, he can buy or sell returns
for any contingency. It is as if there were a separate forward
market for dollars to be delivered in each future state. Viewed
in this light, it is not surprising that a unique set of prices
<q(s,t)[ is a necessary condition for equilibrium.
Previous time-state-preference models have, without signifi-
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cant exception, confined their analysis to this special case.
In fact;, it is usually assumed that trading of contingent re-
turns takes place in explicit markets, rather than implicitly,
via portfolio adjustments. Arrow and Hirshliefer, for in-
22
stance, have assumed markets for "primitive securities":
the primitive security for (s,t) pays one dollar contingent
on (s,t), but nothing in any other state. Thus the equilibrium
23price of such a security would be simply q(s,t)„
24Without denying the theoretical productivity of this special case.
it is important to recognize that the time-state-preference framework is
amenable to considerable generalization and adaptation to particular market
characteristics. I hope the above analysis has established this point.
V. SOME IMPLICATIONS
This section notes some general implications of the time-state-
preference model of security valuation. First, the conventional valuation
formulas are briefly re-examined. Observations follow on the implications
of individual risk aversion for market prices, the interpretation of time-
state-preference models if the catalogue of states is not exhaustively
defined, and the concept of a risk-equivalent class of securities.
Conventional Valuation Formulas
Consider the i th investor, who holds at least one share of the k
stock. Then Eq. (11) holds at equilibrium:
(11) Pk = <2 qi(s,t) Rk (s,t)
s,t
This investor may or may not agree with others on the present value of
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contingent returns. For simplicity's sake, however, we will drop the sub-
script i in what follows.
The formulas normally used are:
Rk .(t) J ^(^ £k(t)(1,2) P = £ ^ ' = £
t=l (l+r)t t=x (1+1)
t
These formulas may be regarded as simplifications of Eq. (11),, Thus the
required rate r or the coefficients oC(t) depend on (1) the pattern across
states of stock k's contingent dividends, (2) the investor's valuations
of contingent returns, and (3) his probability assessments.
For instance, it is shown in the appendix that
zk (t) Q(t)'(23) oC( t ) =
where:
zk (t)7T(t)'
'
Zk (t) =
1
— [Rk (l,t). ... , Rk (m(t) ;,t) ], a vector expressing them
^J.' pattern of contingent
<* ]<<, s ,-t; returns paid by security
s=l
Q(t) =
~^T\ [q(l,t), ...
,
q(m(t),t)], a vector expressing the
<-
, N relative "prices" forP x q(s, t) .
t
' returns contingent on
s-1
.
6
states at time t;
7f(t) = [7T(ljt), ... , 7f(m(t),t) ], a vector of the investor's
probability assessments
for states at time t.
Of course, there is no guarantee that investors will agree on the ap-
propriate size of the coefficients oC(t), since they need not agree on the
vectors Q(t) or TT(t)
.
However, Eq. (23) holds from the point of view of
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A A 1 25any investor considered singly.
Equations (1) and (2) are two among many ways of simplifying the more
basic valuation formula, Eq. (11). Alternative forms based on continuous
compounding and exponential growth are often seen, as are rules of thumb
using price-earnings ratios or "multipliers," Given a little algebraic
ingenuity, the possible formats are endless
„
If one accepts the time-state-preference model as general, it is
pointless to say that any particular simplification is the correct way to
compute present value. The choice among algebraic formats depends on in-
tuitive appeal, tractability and the appropriateness of the assumptions
necessary to the various simplifications. The intelligent user will
choose the method that best fits the case at hand c
Risk Aversion
The next few paragraphs investigate the implications of investors'
risk aversion for the structure of security prices. The conclusions are
generally consistent with those obtained elsewhere, but they bear repe-
tition because of the persistence of the notion that security prices are
adequately explained by simply considering the characteristics of indi-
vidual investors' utility functions.
It is generally accepted that most investors are risk averse. From
this, it is often inferred that "the market" should be risk averse, in the
sense that the certainty equivalent of an uncertain return should always
be no more than the expectation of the return. In other words, the pre-
diction would be that oC (t~) < 1, or that r >. i, where i is the pure rate
of interest.
Actually, it is always possible to construct patterns of contingent
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returns for which q( (t) > 1 for all t, --i„e, } such that r > i„ Note
that the numerator and denominator of Eq. (23) are weighted averages of
relative prices and probabilities, respectively,, In general, the relative
price for (s,t) may be more or less than 7f*(s^t) c By changing the weights
Zjft); therefore, we can always assure that Z (t)Q(t) ' > Z,(t)7T(t)'. or
2 7that o((t) > 1 The economic meaning of this manipulation is that an
expected return will be more valuable if it pays relatively higher returns
in states in which contingent returns have a relatively high value.
On the other hand, suppose the weights Z^(t) are chosen randomly,
subject to the condition that the elements of Z^(t) sum to one. The ex -
pected result of this experiment is that oC^) = 1» (Note that this re-
sult does not depend on the law of large numbers. If Od (t) / 1, it is
due to a sampling error, not to a lack of opportunities for diversifica-
tion.) Securities constructed in this manner would, on the average, be
priced to yield exactly the pure rate of interest.
These mental experiments indicate that a risk premium is not explained
by uncertainty per se, but by some systematic relationship between the
relative sizes of the returns R, (s,t) and the "prices" q(s,t). In actual
markets, the relationship seems to be that returns on most available se-
curities are positively correlated, so that securities tend to pay high
returns precisely when most portfolio returns are high and low returns in
times of scarcity. The normal risk premium is thus explained, given the
inverse relationship between supplies of contingent returns and their pres-
ent values.
One prediction which may be drawn from this argument is that investors
will require no risk premium to gamble, providing that;
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a. The gambling is on a small enough scale that the vector
Q- can be taken as given,
b. The outcome of the gamble is not related to the
state from the set Ws.t'lj which actually occurs.
That is, the gamble must be an "artificially generated
90
risk," not a "natural hazard,,"
29
Interpretation of the Model Given Coarse Partitions of S tates
The application of the time-state-preference model within a rela-
tively coarse partition of the set S of possible event-sequences is entirely
feasible, given attention to several complicating factors , One of these
is that investors will not, in general, adopt identical partitions, so
that agreement among investors on the risk characteristics of securities
cannot be taken for granted. Nevertheless, postulating agreement will often
prove to be appropriate.
Other problems arise regarding the definition of a contingent return.
Given the partition \ ( (j* . t )? which is coarser than -Ms,t)j , the
returns contingent on (o*,t) are the random variables R^itf jt) Q They
cannot be used in the same sense as the variables R^(s, t)- -which are cer -
tain returns, given (s, t) --without further explanation.
Adopting the partition ? ( tf t)l , the investor's decision problem
is to maximize
\j/ = o7r(aJ ,t)E[u(o',t)] + U<0),(24)
<t,t
subject to a wealth constraint . where
N
(25) E[U(a^t)] = E[U(i5 hkRk ((^.t))],
k=l
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The value of E[U( (f , t) ] could be computed readily if the investor had
specified the returns R^s^t), the probabilities Jf{s s t) (given ( (f,t)) ,
and the functions U(s,t); but he does not have this information. A reason-
able heuristic tool is to rewrite his decision problem ass
(24a) ^ = <§V((J%t) ^(^t) +U(0),
N
(25a) U(cy%t) = U( £ hkCEQk(^t)).
k=l
Here CEQj
c
((j',t) is the < artainty equivalent of Rk ( (f . t) --that is, if state
(CT^t) occurs, the investor is indifferent to receiving Rj
c (tf' a t) or a cer-
amount
tain/CEQk ( CT\ t) . The investor is assumed to act a_s _if he is certain to
N
receive a portfolio return of £L hkCEQi<( cT*, t) if ((J^t) occurs.
This is an easy way out only if the certainty equivalent can itself
be explained without undue complication. Various simple relationships
might be assumed if the partition represented by the set v(o/ „t) 7 is
not too coarse. If, for instance, the partition is fine enough to describe
all systematic interrelationships among security returns, then one could
of 30postulate that CEQ^Q^t) = E[ Rk ((j',t)]. The reasoning here is as follows.
If there are no systematic interrelationships among security returns, given
(0'jt)
J
,
then the returns R^Co^t) of the N securities are independent ran-
dom variables. Under these conditions, one would expect to find that the
random return Rk ((/.t) and a certain return of the amount E[R, (cr*,t)] are
equally valuable, given that {(f,t) occurs. That is, this would be the
expected result if the investor assessed the present value of Rj
c
((J
/
,t)
' 1 31
with the set of states Hs,t)f in mind. There is, of course, some
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chance for error: the coarser the partition, the less likely it is that
the postulated relationship will be an adequate approximation,,
"Risk Classes" as a Consequence of Coarse Partitions
In a time-state-preference framework, the risk characteristics of
the k security are determined by its pattern of returns across the possi-
ble states of nature. The vector X^,, defined by Eq. (22), is one way to
describe this pattern.
Unfortunately, it is not very helpful to say that securities j and k
are in the same risk class if X- = X^, for this requires the returns
Rk(s,t) and R^(s^t) to be perfectly correlated in every contingency. If
this is true, there is little point in calling j and k different securities,
The use of such a definition would thus require creating a risk class for
every security, and it implies that no two securities can be considered
perfect substitutes.
This is not surprising, considering that individuals are assumed to
have made the computational investment necessary to evaluate securities
within the set of states S(s,t)/
.
A smaller computational effort yields
a coarser partition, and a corresponding reduction in the investor's
ability to distinguish among the risk characteristics of securities. If
computation is costly, it is perfectly conceivable that an investor will
consider the j and k securities to be perfect substitutes, knowing
that X.: ± X^, but not being able to specify the differences among the two
(because of a coarse partition of future states) in any which would allow
a choice among them. Thus the concept of a class of securities with
homogeneous risk characteristics— found useful by Modigliani and Miller,
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•}
for instance --is not unreasonable if computational effort is a scarce
resource.
VI. THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF INVESTORS' STRATEGIES
The model of security valuation presented in this paper is not
realistic in any strict sense. No theory is. On the other hand, the as-
sumptions used are mostly familiar ones; few readers will be surprised
to encounter such abstractions as the Perfect Market or the Rational
Investor,
The one novel assumption is that all investors purchase portfolios
at t = with the certain intention of holding them unchanged until a
(distant) horizon at t = T c This proviso insures that investors' port-
folio choices are independent
,
in the sense that the expected utility of
any investor's portfolio depends only on the cash returns of the securi-
ties included, and in no way on possible future actions of other investors,
It takes only cursory observation of actual security markets to see
that this assumption of a "one-shot" portfolio choice is inaccurate. In-
vestors' strategies are clearly interdependent, for instance, if securi-
ties are purchased partly for anticipated capital gains. Here the return
realized by any particular investor depends not only on the state (s^t)
occurring, but also on what other investors think the security is worth.
The interdependence of investors' strategies is a matter of consid-
erable theoretical interest and uncertain practical importance. This
section is a brief, qualitative examination of the problems involved.
Why Investors Revi s e Their Po r tfolios
There are two sorts of reasons why an investor may sell securities
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from his original portfolio before the horizon period at t = T,
1, To provide funds for consumption . - -An investor may sell securi-
ties if the cash returns on his portfolio do not sustain his desired
consumption expenditures „ Some of these consumption needs, such as retire-
ment income, are fairly predictable, but others are not: security invest-
ment serves in part as a cushion or reserve source of funds which may be
needed unexpectedly for other uses.
It is important, however, to look one step behind this proximate
cause of the sale of securities. Our previous assumption of a one-shot
investment decision is not necessarily inconsistent with an investor's
providing exactly for a large contingent cash payment, since there will
be some portfolio with a pattern of returns across the set of states
which is appropriate,, If this pattern lies within the cone spanned by
the vectors X^ of available securities, then the investor can purchase a
portfolio now to meet these contingent needs precisely. For instance,
a certain requirement for x dollars of retirement income t years hence can
be provided for in advance by purchasing government bonds of the appro-
priate maturity.
However, such opportunities do not generally exist for all types of
consumption needs, since the actual number of securities is too small to
span more than a small portion of the different patterns of portfolio re-
turns which may be desired. Moreover, the problem is only partially
solved by postulating the "special case" in which an investor can obtain
any conceivable pattern in the vector space defined by the set of states
A(s,t) r . Suppose, for instance, that an investor perceives the possi-
bility of a personal emergency at t = 1, He will not be able to provide
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for the emergency situation by his portfolio choice unless securities exist
which give different returns contingent on the occurrence of the emer-
gency,, Unless it is related in some way to economic conditions on a
broader scale^ this will not be the case. One would not expect to find
securities offering different returns contingent on the occurrence of an
event of purely personal interest. Even in this special case, therefore,
an investor's need for a large amount of money income contingent on a
personal event cannot always be met without portfolio adjustments when
the event occurs,
2. Portfo lio choice is a sequential decision problem,, Whereas the
contingent needs just discussed are needs for funds t_o be consumed , in-
vestors may also wish to reinvest these funds in other securities . There
are two motives for this sort of trading. First, the passage of time
and the resolution of uncertainty yield changes in the risk characteristics
and relative prices of available securities as well as the investor's
probability judgments and preferences,, His attitudes to risk may also
change. The result is that the portfolio which is optimal at t = may
not be at t = 1„ Second, the investor may believe he can anticipate
changes in security prices accurately enough so that speculative trading
is advisable.
This second class of reasons for investors to anticipate the possible
future sale of securities is particularly important, since these considera-
tions can be formally analyzed only by explicit treatment of portfolio
choice as a sequential decision problem. The nature of this problem may
be indicated by noting that, in our model, the marginal utility to an in-
vestor of money in (s,t) is dependent only on his portfolio choice at
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t = 0, since the returns yielded by the portfolio are determined solely by
this choice. In general, however, the return received in (s,t) also de-
pends on (a) the opportunities which develop before time t and (b) the
investor's strategy in pursuing these opportunities,, In this more gen-
eral case, the marginal utility of income in (s,t) cannot be deduced
solely from consideration of the initial portfolio choice. The result is
that this variable cannot be derived and used to evaluate contingent re-
turns in (s,t) without further analysis.
Unfortunately, none of the conventional models of security valuation
allow adequate formal analysis of this sequential, stochastic decision
problem. The framework presented in this paper is similarly ill-equipped,
at least at the present stage of its development
„
Treatment of These Problems in the Literature of Finance
The problems raised by the interdependence of investors ' strategies
have been recognized, but not emphasized, in the literature. In essence,
what has been done is to assume that these problems have no systematic
effect on the valuation process.
Suppose we begin by comparing (a) an investor's valuation of an in-
cremental share of a security on the assumption that he will hold the share
until the ultimate horizon, time T, to (b) his valuation of this share
assuming that it is to be sold in some period t < T. The bundle of contin-
gent returns he receives in case (b) differs from (a.) in the substitution
of the security's price at t for the contingent dividends paid by the firm
between t and T. Since the level and risk characteristics of the security's
price at time t are closely associated with those of the security's bundle
of contingent returns subsequent to that time, it is a reasonable
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first approximation to assume that the present value of the price at t and
the bundle of subsequent returns is the same. Given this assumption, the
value of any security can be expressed solely as a function of its contin-
gent cash returns,
37This argument, which has been widely used in the literature, also
justifies any of the results which can be obtained by use of the basic
time -state -preference model presented above
.
The difficulty is that the risk characteristics of a security price
at some future date t are also dependent on all investors' demands for
this security at that time. These demands cannot be predicted with cer-
tainty (given the security's contingent payments up to time t), since
the preferences and strategies of investors are not determined solely
by the state of nature which obtains. (Remember that we have defined
states only in terms of contingent cash returns on securities; the cata-
logue does not cover all conceivable events.) Therefore, the investor
who may sell a security at time t is exposed to uncertainty about other
investors ' future demands rn addition to the uncertainty inherent in its
bundle of subsequent contingent returns. This price uncertainty is pre-
cisely why the interdependence of investors ' strategies is potentially im-
portant to any theory of security valuation. Its actual importance cannot
be determined here, but the next subsection cites two situations in which
it is likely to be relevant.
Situations in Which the Interdependence of Investors' Strategies is
Likely to be Relevant
1. Short-term price fluctuations . --The random, seemingly senseless,
short-term fluctuations of stock prices, to say nothing of the speculative
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bubbles that occur from time to time, are regarded by many as less re-
lated to changes in the present value of future cash returns than to other,
"irrational" factors. Often this conclusion is reached too casually.
Firsts volatility does not establish irrationality, since there is nothing
irrational about changing one's mind. Second, "irrationality" is a loose
word. It seems to refer to price changes unrelated to factors relevant in
stable equilibria populated by Economic Man.
But if it does exist, this irrationality may be attributed to one or
both of two reasons. First, investors may tend to make mistakes in the
pursuit of their own interests. Second, investors may be "concerned, not
with what an investment is really worth to a. man who buys it 'for keeps,
'
but with what the market will value it at, under the influence of mass
psychology, three months or a year hence. "^° In this case, the interde-
pendence of investors' strategies is dominant.
2. Commitments to Future Sa l e or Purchase of Securities . --Interest-
ing theoretical problems are not always empirically relevant. Suppose we
predicted the structure of security prices on the assumption that the
prices depend only on the securities' contingent cash returns. Could we
then improve our prediction by taking the interdependence of investors'
strategies into account? Such an improvement could take place only if (a)
securities differ in ways not reflected in their sets of contingent cash
returns and (b) these differences are relevant to the investor because of
the interdependence of investors' strategies.
Some such differences might be found where the "irrational" behavior
just discussed seems most prevalent; but we will not belabor this topic
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further. To take another tack, note that the commitment to buy or sell a
security at a future date (or in a particular state of nature) clearly ex-
poses the investor to price uncertainty; the extent of exposure depends
on the extent of the commitment. We would expect security prices to be
affected by the interdependence of investors ' strategies where strong com-
mitments are common. It should suffice here to cite two examples.
The many studies of the term structure of interest rates have in-
vestigated the effects, if any, of price uncertainty. The liquidity pre-
mium found by most such studies is interpreted as an extra payment made
by holders of short-term bonds for protection from price uncertainty,, It
may not be clear, however, how a commitment to buy or sell bonds is in-
volved.
If an investor "needs" a certain amount of funds in ten years, we
might refer to t = 10 as his "natural habitat," since a bond maturing at
that time would be ideal for him. Higher anticipated yields on bonds of
different maturities may lure him from his natural habitat, but if he does
so he is exposed to price uncertainty. If the "need" is in fact given,
purchasing a five-year bond now commits him to buy another bond at t = 5,
and bond yields at that time are uncertain. On the other hand, buying a
fifteen-year bond effectively commits him to selling, at an uncertain price,
at t = 10. Thus an investor can be said to commit himself to future sales
or purchases when he forsakes his natural habitat. These commitments are
41
one consideration explaining the liquidity premiums just noted.
A second type of implied commitment is found in much corporate borrow-
ing, evidenced by the frequent refinancing of corporate issues. Most firms
borrow for relatively short periods, compared with the de facto maturities
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of their assets. When this is done, the firm commits itself to refinanc-
ing when the borrowed funds are due. If new borrowing is to be undertaken,
the firm's shareholders are indirectly exposed to the price uncertainty
reflected in uncertainty about the level and term structure of interest
rates.
To be sure, the commitment to borrow is not absolute, since the share-
holders always have the option of providing additional future financing
themselves. This is easily done by retention of earnings if the firm is
not highly leveraged; otherwise, new securities would have to be issued.
Unfortunately, the effects of price uncertainty are not avoided in either
case. If refinancing by shareholders is anticipated, ownership of the
firm's shares implies a commitment to make an additional investment in
some future period or contingencies. In general, there is no guarantee
that such an investment is consistent with portfolios which would other-
wise be optimal at that time. If it is not consistent, we would expect
an adverse effect on the present price of the firm's shares. The magni-
tude of the effect would depend on the firm's debt-equity ratio and the
disparity between the maturity structures of its assets and liabilities.
VII. CONCLUDING NOTE
Hieshleifer has remarked that "one surprising aspect of the time-and-
state preference model is that it leads to a theory of decision under uncer-
tainty while entirely excluding the 'vagueness' we usually associate with
uncertainty." It should now be clear that such precision is not a nec-
essary characteristic of all time-state-preference models, but only of the
special case Hirshleifer was concerned with. Given a limited number of
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securities, restrictions on short sales, and the possible effects of the
interdependence of investors ' strategies, a certain amount of vagueness
seems unavoidable. Thus Eq„ (7), the most basic valuation formula, is an
inequality.
I do not find this particularly discouraging, since the effects of
such imperfections as restrictions on short sales will appear in any
model. Vagueness seems to be characteristic of actual problems, not of
the models we invent to solve them.
To be sure, it will often be sufficient to assume that prices are de-
termined as if the world were perfectly precise. But we have shown that
time-state-preference models are still useful when vagueness is unavoid-
able.

APPENDIX
The problem is to show that, if o(.(t) is defined so that
(2,11) Pk = I q(-,t)Bk(.,t) = h ^n^
s,t t=l d+i) 1
then
Z, (t)Q(t) '
Where Zk (t), Q(t) and JJ"(t) are the vectors defined on p„ 23.
m(t)
The value of one dollar delivered in every state at time t is ^ q(s,t)
s=l
The riskless interest rate is thus defined by
m(t)
Noting the definitions of the vectors Q(t) and Zk (t), we can write for
Eq. (2):
m(t)
T Zk (t)Q(t)' £ Rk (s,t)
Pk = L s=l
t=1 (1+1)
t
For each period, multiply by
Rk (t) Rk (t)
^vo
—
" 1V t; Zk (t)/T(t)' £x Rk (s,t)
s=l
38
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Equation (2) becomes
Pk =
£j o^ vo7T(o' Rk(t)
Thus the coefficient o^(t) may be expressed by Eq. (23).

FOOTNOTES
1. This paper is a further development of my doctoral dissertation [24],
which was submitted to the Graduate School of Business, Stanford Univer-
sity, in 1967. I am indebted for good advice and apt suggestions to my
dissertation committee, Professors Alexander Robichek, Gert von der Linde
and Ezra Solomon. Also, Professor Kenneth Arrow was kind enough to read
and comment on the entire dissertation. I wish also to thank Professors
Jack Hirshleifer, Avraham Beja and Peter Diamond for helpful comments.
This research was Jsrgely supported by a Ford Foundation Doctoral
Fellowship. Neither the Ford Foundation nor the persons cited above are
responsible for my opinions or mistakes.
2. Assistant Professor of Finance, Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.
3. The framework is due to Arrow [2] and has been extended and expounded
by Debreu [5], esp. ch. vii, and Hirshleifer [10] [11] [12]„ See also
Radner [27], Dreze [7], Pye [26], Diamond [4] and Beja [3] for examples of
related work. Lancaster [16] has used similar analytical framework in re-
cent discussions of theory of consumer choice.
4. In the articles already cited.
5. In the articles already cited.
6. Lack of space constrains me from detailed analysis of particular financ-
ing or investment problems. This is done in my dissertation [24]. For an
40
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earlier version of part of the analysis presented there, see Robichek and
Myers [29 ]„ For other applications of a time-state-preference model, see
Hirshleifer [11], esp. pp. 264-68.
7. Although current^ or expected average, earnings are often used as a
proxy for the dividend stream,
8. See Robichek and Myers [30],
9. See Robichek and Myers [28], and Lintner [19], 27-28„
10. The classic exposition for the certainty case is Fisher's [8]„ Also,
see Hirshleifer [13].
11. Markowitz [20], Sharpe [31], and Lintner [18] [19].
12. See Lintner [19], p. 27
13. The choice of a particular partition is arbitrary. An even coarser
partition than that used here would undoubtedly be more "realistic," since
investors would in practice regard computational efforts as a scarce re-
source. The intuitive meaning of a still finer partition is difficult to
pin down, if only because no one person is likely to be interested in
more than a small subset of the conceivable event sequences comprising the
set S.
The interpretation of time-state-preference models given coarser
partitions than J(s,t) r is discussed in Section V^ below.
14. The horizon t = T is introduced primarily for analytical convenience.
There is some error because of the lack of explicit analysis of events
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subsequent to the horizon, but the effect of any such errors on the market's
valuation of securities at t = may be considered negligible if the hori-
zon is far enough distant in time,,
15„ It is true that the contingent returns received by stock- and bond-
holders are affected if the firm replaces equity with debt. However, the
bundles of contingent returns offered by the firm's securities can still
be clearly specified within the set of states j(s,t) r } provided that (a)
there is no change in the total contingent returns paid by the firm on all
its outstanding securiti°5 and (b) investors are certain about how the
firm's total payout is to be divided among stock- and bondholders in every
possible contingency. Although these conditions may not always hold in
practice (see Robichek and Myers [29]jesp. pp. 15-19) they are a rea-
sonable approximation for present purposes.
IS. However, there is no requirement that all securities may pay returns
in all time periods from t = 1 to t = T, Bonds, in particular, will
often mature before the horizon period.
17. As noted by Hirshleifer [12], pp. 523-34.
18. Kuhn and Tucker [15], Also, see Dorfman, Samuelson and Solow [6],
ch. vii, for the exposition which prompted my use of the conditions. Re-
member that the conditions to be presented are not sufficient for equili-
brium. For instance, one necessary condition not mentioned is that the
utility functions U(s,t) be convex--i„e. , risk-averse. See Arrow [2], p. 95,
Also, in the absence of any direct or indirect restraints on the ability
of investors to sell single contingent payments, we must require that
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77~(s,t) > for all investors (indexed by i) and all (s
J)
t) If an
investor really believes that the contingency (s,t) is impossible, he
will be willing to sell contingent payments in (s,t) in unlimited amounts.
This latter point was mentioned to me by Avraham Beja. For a detailed
treatment of the existence of possible equilibrium states, see Debreu [5],
19. Since from the nature of the problem the constraint Eq e (4) must
be satisfied exactly, ^(0) cannot be zero.
20. Given the distant horizon T, the short sale becomes a promise to pay
security k's dividends from period t = 1 to t = T to the lender of the
security. The payments include the security's price at t = T, which we
have interpreted as a liquidating dividend. Thus selling short is the
sale of future contingent returns. That we do not actually find short
sales undertaken as long-term commitments is apparently due to uncertainty
about whether any particular investor could fulfill such a contract. Mar-
gin requirements are a reaction to this uncertainty.
21. This result may hold even if short sales are restricted. But this
requires that (a) the vectors of returns of available securities— includ-
ing borrowing and any "dummy securities" used to describe types of trad-
ing different from simple purchases--span a cone equivalent to the M-
dimensional space created by the set <(s,t)A and (b) that Eq. ( 7 ) holds
with an equality for all securities and all investors. Note that in this
case the number of securities would have to be substantially more than the
number of states.
22. See Arrow [2], Hirshleifer calls these primitive securities "time-
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state claims," [12]^ p. 527, and passim ,
23. The set of primitive securities and the M normal securities con-
sidered above are simply alternative bases for the vector space defined
in terms of j"(s,t)J .
24. For instance, the special case has generated considerable insight into
the problem of determining optimal capital structure for corporations See
Robichek and Myers [29] and Hirshleifer [11] pp. 264-68.
25. Confidence in the cVeoretical appropriateness of certaintv eauivalents
may be somewhat increased by finding that they can be conveniently ex-
pressed in a time-state-preference framework, Unfortunately, the required
rate r cannot be conveniently expressed- -a fact which corroborates Lintner's
view that r is not a "primary" variable for theoretical uses. See Lintner
[19], pp. 27-28.
26. See^ for instance, Dreze [7],, pp. 36-38; Lintner [19], pp.22-23,
27. If 77X0 = Q(t)j o£(t) = 1 for any pattern on contingent returns.
This is improbable,
28. The terms are Hirshleifer 's
.
[12], p, 532,
29. The following comments are not subject to the same standards of pre-
cision as is the exposition of the "basic model" in Section 111 above.
Nevertheless., they may be helpful in indicating the options open to model-
builders within the time-state-preference framework,
30. Note that a parallel argument concerning the certainty equivalent
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coefficient oC(t) is given above, p. 25.
31 This procedure presumes the investor to be indifferent to the vagueness
created by use of the set of states \(<f jtj f instead of J(s^t)£ .
Whether such indifference represents rational behavior is an interesting
open question.
32. However, because of the general benefits of diversification, the in-
vestor may hold both securities in his portfolio.
33. See Modigliani and Xiller [22
]
These comments are not meant to imply
that the concept of a risk class is necessary to the proof of Modigliani
and Miller's Proposition I--that the market value of the firm is independ-
ent of financial leverage in the absence of taxes on corporate income. The
proposition can be readily proved given the detailed partition defined by
<(s,t) / } in which no two securities can be said to belong to the same
risk class. See Hirshleifer L iL J, PP. 264-68. and Robichek and Myers [29],
34. Such a portfolio would yieLd relatively high returns in the states
in which the contingent needs occur, but relatively low returns otherwise.
This case illustrates the pitfalls of always associating risk aversion with
the variability of a portfolio's contingent returns.
35. It may be possible for an investor to i ssue securities which are dif-
ferentiated in this regard. We see this in practice as insurance. But
many risks are not insurable so that we can count on some emergencies
remaining.
The reasons why investors usually cannot issue securities to cover
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all contingent needs have been discussed by Radner [27] and Arrow[l], pp.
45-56. Transaction costs are an obvious reason. Another is the diffi-
culty of writing a contract in which the duties of the parties depend on
which state of nature actually occurs, when the catalogue of states is
not exhaustively defined,, A third reason is that the very existence of a
contract may change the subsequent actions of the parties to it, in turn
affecting the probabilities of occurrence of the states on which the con-
tract is contingent. As Arrow [1] notes (p„ 55) this problem arises in
practice when insurance policies may make the issuing company vulnerable
to a "moral hazard „"
36. An important assumption made in our model is that all contingent
returns are consumed--i.e. , not reinvested in securities.
37. For example, see Gordon [9], pp. 131-32. Porterfield [25], p. 19,
Lintner [19], p. 27. Lintner uses a slight variant of this assumption in
another paper. See [17], p. 69.
38. Keynes [14], pp. 154-55.
39. Some of the irrational aspects could be ruled out by assuming "sym-
metric market rationality," which requires that every individual (a) is
rational in pursuit of his own interests and (b) imputes rationality to
the market. See Miller and Modigliani [21], pp. 427-28. However, this
is not sufficient to make investors' strategies independent.
40. The term is Modigliani and Sutch's [23].
41. They are not sufficient explanations. For instance, see Modigliani
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and Sutch [23], pp. 183-84.
42. Robichek and Myers [29] discuss how the necessity to refinance may
effect the optimal degree of leverage for highly leveraged firms.
43. In the "special case" discussed in Section IV above, however, the
investor could always offset the effect of the additional investment by
short sales and/or sale of other securities in his portfolio. Thus the
commitment to invest additional amounts does not constrain his portfolio
choice. In less idealized worlds, the commitment may be binding.
44. Hirshleifer [12], p. 534.
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